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RESPONSE BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly rule that the media failed to 
satisfy the two-part test in Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior 
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) r"Press Enterprise II" 1 for extending a 
First Amendment presumptive right of public access to any pretrial 
documents filed in a court, including those filed in conjunction 
with warrant and subpoena issuance? 
2. Did the media waive any claim that, under a separate test, the 
Utah Constitution creates a presumptive right of public access to 
such documents, even if the federal constitution does not, by 
failing to raise this issue in the trial court? In any event, have 
the media failed to demonstrate a basis for recognizing a separate 
state constitutional presumptive right of public access to any 
1 
pretrial documents filed in a court, including those filed in 
conjunction with warrant or subpoena issuance? 
3. Did the trial court correctly rule that the media failed to 
establish any Utah common law right of public access to pretrial 
documents filed in a court, including those filed in conjunction 
with warrant or subpoena issuance? Regardless of whether the trial 
court was correct on this point, was any such right superseded via 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 (1986) by the statutory right of public 
access to judicial records and other public writings in the now-
repealed Public and Private Writings Act and the Archives and 
Records Services Act? 
4. Did the media adequately present for the trial court's 
determination the issue of whether the common law of Utah, the 
first amendment of the United States Constitution, or article I, 
section 15 of the Utah Constitution presumptively guarantee 
physical access by the public, before trial, to inspect and copy 
all exhibits admitted into evidence at a preliminary hearing? 
5. Have the media established an adequate basis for extending a 
separate constitutional right of physical access by the public, for 
inspection and copying before trial, to all exhibits admitted into 
evidence at a preliminary hearing? 
6. Is there a common law right in Utah of physical access by the 
public, for inspection and copying before trial, to all exhibits 
admitted into evidence at a preliminary hearing? Is any such right 
supplanted by the Utah statutes governing public access to, and 
copying of, judicial records as public records? 
2 
These issues present questions of law only, on which the trial 
court's rulings are reviewed for correctness• Standard Fed. 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS 
In this appeal, the media seek two broadly framed extensions of 
current constitutional law and common law far beyond the factual 
circumstances presented by this case and far beyond the legal 
questions actually posed to, and decided by, the trial court. 
These criminal cases arise from a particularly gruesome 
homicide in southern Utah on November 22, 1988, involving sexual 
assault, kidnapping, and torture of twenty-eight-year-old Gordon 
Church of Delta, Utah. Among other things, Church had been bound 
and gagged, chained, had battery cables attached to his genitals, 
was repeatedly beaten, had his skin pierced, was anally raped and 
impaled twice with an 18" tire iron, and subsequently had his skull 
shattered and brain pulpified with repeated blows from the tire 
iron and various parts of a car jack (Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript at 77-139). 
The justice court sealed its own case file on November 25, 1988 
(R. 3-4), based on the State's motion that day (R. 1-2) 
representing that closure was then necessary to protect the ongoing 
criminal investigation. The file contained the following pretrial 
documents: probable cause affidavits for the arrests of defendants 
Archuleta and Wood, executed by Deputy Millard County Attorney 
Dexter Anderson on November 24, 1988, and November 25, 1988, 
respectively (R. 1297-1300; R. 1301-1305); affidavit for search 
3 
warrant of Archuleta's girlfriend's apartment (R„ 1312-13); and 
affidavit for search warrant of the person of defendant Archuleta 
(R. 1316-1323). These documents contained detailed but partially 
conflicting information about the conduct of the crimes, obtained 
from separate police interviews with defendants Wood and Archuleta. 
Each defendant had identified the other as the prime actor in the 
atrocities, to which each claimed to have been an unwitting 
spectator. 
On December 15, 1988, the media filed a motion to intervene in 
the criminal cases for the purpose of challenging the closure of 
the justice court files (R. 65). In their supporting memoranda, 
the media claimed that, under the federal and state constitutions, 
the presumption of openness of criminal preliminary hearings 
recognized in Press Enterprise II and Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. 
Lewis, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984), should be extended to any document 
once filed in any court (R. 13-14, 76-77). Based on this premise, 
the media asserted that the sealing of any court record in a 
criminal case was not constitutionally permissible until after 
notice to the media and a hearing, at which the media were present 
and at which the proponent of closure of the court file was able to 
prevail under the balancing test set out in Kearns-Tribune and 
Press Enterprise II for closure of a preliminary hearing to protect 
a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial and an 
impartial jury (R. 14-16, 78). 
On January 24, 1989, Magistrate Hare granted intervention but, 
over the media's objection, granted defendants' motion to close 
4 
their joint preliminary hearing, which began that day, in order to 
protect their rights to a fair trial and impartial jury (Transcript 
of Preliminary Hearing, Vol. I at 50-51; R. 118-120). He also 
ordered that documents in the justice court file containing any 
evidence, including the probable cause statements and affidavits 
for search warrants, remain sealed (Transcript of Preliminary 
Hearing, Vol. I at 52). Other documents in the file at that time 
that did not contain such evidence were to be open to public 
inspection (Ld.). The magistrate subsequently refused to 
reconsider these rulings (R. 121).* 
At the closed, joint preliminary hearing of defendants 
Archuleta and Wood, the magistrate received into evidence the 
following exhibits (Supplemental Record Item B, R. 1535-1538): 
Exhibit 1: Certified copy of 11/24/88 Autopsy report by 
Dr. Sharon Schnittker. 
Exhibit 2: Nine diagrams prepared by Dr. Schnittker 
showing damage inflicted on various sections of Gordon Ray 
Church's body, three of front of body, one of back, one of 
entire body, one of head (anterior and posterior views), 
two of head (lateral views), one of base of skull (inferior 
and superior views) one of brain (inferior, superior, and 
lateral views). 
Exhibit 3: Fluid and tissue samples (blood, pubic hair, 
scalp hair, arm pit hair) taken from Gordon Ray Church body 
during autopsy for testing at Crime Lab. 
Exhibit 4: Tire iron with hexagonal wrench on the end. 
Exhibits 5f 6: Leg and ratchet section of car jack. 
Exhibits 7-9: Battery cables and clamp. 
Exhibit 10: Wire cutters. 
Exhibits 11, 12: Photographs of victim's father's car. 
Exhibit 13: Base of car jack. 
Exhibits 14, 15: Tire chains. 
Exhibits 16, 17: Bungie cords. 
xThe media then filed a separate action in District Court 
against the magistrate, seeking relief from the closure of the 
court file and the preliminary hearing by way of mandamus. No 
ruling was ever obtained in that action. 
5 
Exhibit 18: Wire cutters. 
Exhibit 19: Fishing tackle box used as tool box by victim. 
Exhibit 20: Photograph of open trunk of car owned by 
victim's father. 
Exhibit 20: Photograph of victim working at K-Mart. 
Exhibit 22: Enlargement of Ex. 21 showing victim's wrist. 
Exhibits 23, 24: Victim's wristwatch and watch box. 
Exhibits 25, 26: Victim's pants and suede coat. 
Exhibits 27: Defendant Archuleta's levis. 
Exhibit 28: Knife blade. 
Exhibit 29: Defendant Wood's pants. 
Exhibits 34, 35: Hair sample and bone fragment. 
Exhibit 36: Dirt sample containing human blood. 
Exhibit 37: Photograph of gag removed from victim's mouth 
at autopsy. 
Exhibits 43, 46: Latent fingerprint cards from car driven 
by victim. 
Exhibits 44, 45: Ten-print fingerprint card and palm 
impression taken from Defendant Wood. 
Exhibits 48, 50: Two lamps and fan taken from trunk of car 
driven by victim. 
Exhibit 49: Bumper sticker from bumper of car driven by 
victim. 
Exhibit 53: Green folder. 
Exhibits 54, 55, 56: Diagrams by witness of where she saw 
victim and Defendant Archuleta. 
Exhibit 57: Diagram by Paula Sue Jones of hear apartment. 
Exhibits 60, 60a: Transcript of Archuleta interview of 
11/24-25/88; audiotape of same. 
Exhibits 61, 61a: Transcript of Archuleta interview of 
11/27/88; audiotape of same. 
Exhibits 62, 62a: Transcript of Archuleta interview of 
12/2/88; audiotape of same. 
Exhibits 63, 63a: Transcript of Wood interview of 
11/26/88; audiotape of same. 
The tapes and transcripts of the defendants' inculpatory 
statements to police during lengthy interviews (Exs. 60, 60a, 61, 
61a, 62, 62a, 63, 63a) were not played or read into the record at 
the preliminary hearing. Instead, they were simply received in 
evidence for purposes of the magistrate's bindover determination 
(Transcript of Preliminary Hearing, Vol. Ill at 771, 783). For 
this reason, Magistrate Hare kept the interview transcripts, 
retaining them in the justice court file so he could read them 
6 
after the hearing (Id. at 832). Exhibit 25, the victim's stained 
pants, were returned to the State Crime Lab for further testing of 
the stains on them for blood (Id.). The other exhibits admitted 
into evidence were returned to the secure storage facility at the 
Millard County Sheriff's Office. (.Id. at 784, 830). 
Magistrate Hare's April 5, 1989, bindover order directed that 
the seal on the justice court file continue and ordered the 
transcripts of the preliminary hearing sealed (R. 496). After 
obtaining jurisdiction over the two separate criminal cases, 
District Court Judges George Ballif and Boyd Park ordered both 
seals continued on May 25, 1989, in the two cases (R. 497, 504). 
Two weeks later, the media filed a motion as intervenors to unseal 
the justice court files and release the transcripts of the 
preliminary hearing (R. 506-07). 
In arguing for removal of the district court's seal on the 
justice court file, the media once again broadly claimed: (1) The 
public has a presumptive constitutional right of access to all 
pretrial documents once they are filed in any court under the tests 
enunciated in Press Enterprise II and Reams-Tribune for when the 
first amendment and state constitutional right of public access 
should be extended to pretrial criminal proceedings. (2) Once a 
constitutional right of access is held to extend to pretrial court 
documents, the presumption is that they are open to the public. 
These documents could be sealed, the media asserted, only if there 
were prior notice to the media of the proposed seal and a hearing 
before sealing that resulted in findings Kearns-Tribune and Press 
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Enterprise II made prerequisite to closure of a preliminary 
hearing. (Transcript of Hearing July 21, 1989, at 53-54; 
Memorandum, R. 142-144, 147-152; Supplemental Statement, R. 596-
600). The State countered that the first premise had not been 
established, i.e., the media had failed to satisfy either of the 
two prongs of the Press-Enterprise II test by showing that (a) 
historical experience counseled in favor of finding a 
constitutional right of access here, and (b) public access would 
play a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question. Therefore, there was no basis for 
holding that there is a constitutionally created right of public 
access to, and concomitant presumption of openness of, the 
particular pretrial documents under seal here, probable cause 
statements and affidavits in support of warrants (Supplemental 
Statement, R. 634-35, 639-42). 
With regard to the issue of access to the transcripts of the 
preliminary hearing, Judges Ballif and Park recognized the public's 
presumptive right of access to a preliminary hearing and thus to 
the transcripts of the preliminary hearing in this case (R. 526-
27).2 Accordingly, the two judges held an evidentiary hearing on 
September 7, 1989, of the type required by Reams -Tribune and Press 
Enterprise II. in order to weigh the media's presumed right of 
access to the preliminary hearing transcripts against the 
2The public is entitled to a transcript of the closed portions 
of a preliminary hearing at the earliest time consistent with the 
countervailing interests that necessitated closure. Kearns-
Tribune, 685 P.2d at 524. 
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defendants' rights to a fair and impartial jury (R. 526-27). The 
State's position, and that of both defendants, was that release of 
the preliminary hearing transcripts would, due to the grotesque 
nature of the torture, object rape, and killing of the victim, 
inflame members of the small local community where the case was to 
be tried, making it impossible to select an impartial jury at 
Archuleta's trial, then scheduled to begin on October 10, 1989 
(Transcript of Hearing of September 11, 1989 at 18-22, 69). 
In their October 23, 1989, ruling (R. 943-945), Judges Park and 
Ballif granted the media's motion to release the preliminary 
hearing transcripts, thereby granting the media access "to those 
matters they could have reported had the Court been open and the 
Media representatives permitted to attend." (R. 944). However, the 
court declined to unseal the "pretrial documents" in the justice 
court file (R. 944). In their memorandum decision, the judges 
explained that release of some of the evidence received via 
witnesses and exhibits at the preliminary hearings (ultimately 
enumerated in Finding of Fact 18 at R. 1066-68) would create a 
realistic likelihood of prejudice to defendants' fair trial rights 
but that, under the standards set out in Kearns-Tribune and Press 
Enterprise II, there were other procedures available to them, 
particularly change of venue3 and jury voir dire, that reduced the 
likelihood of prejudice to a point consistent with release of the 
3In the same order, the court transferred venue from Millard 
County to Utah County. Both defendants were subsequently 
convicted, and their appeals are currently pending before this 
Court in State v. Archuleta, Supreme Court No. 900041, and State v. 
Wood, Supreme Court No. 900194. 
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preliminary hearing transcripts (R. 950-56). 
With respect to the seal on the justice court file, the judges 
explained that the "pretrial documents" for which they were denying 
the media's claimed First Amendment presumptive right of public 
access included "probable cause statements, affidavits in support 
of search warrants, subpoenas for witnesses, evidence obtained as 
a result of the use of such pretrial documents, and tangible items 
of evidence including pictorial and diagnostic exhibits, and all 
other Court documents not specifically published as part of the 
preliminary hearing proceedings[.]" (R. 957-58). The judges thus 
viewed the media's generic constitutional argument about access to 
"pretrial documents" as encompassing "access" to documentary 
evidence admitted at the preliminary hearing and thereby made part 
of the justice court file.4 
Over two months later, at a hearing on objections to proposed 
findings and conclusions, the media raised the separate issue of a 
right to "access" and copy any evidence admitted at a preliminary 
hearing (Transcript of Hearing January 19, 1990, at 38-39, 64). A 
surprised Judge Ballif stated that the media "has never been 
admitted beyond the bar," and Judge Park agreed (.Id. at 60-61). 
Judge Ballif stated he had never had a request from the media to 
come into the counsel area and view exhibits admitted into evidence 
during a court proceeding (Id. at 61). Once a preliminary hearing 
4This view is eminently reasonable in light of the fact that 
the transcripts of defendants' statements to police, the only 
evidence at the preliminary hearing that does not appear in some 
form in the transcripts of the preliminary hearing, was also a 
"pretrial document" that was in the justice court file under seal. 
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was over, he stated he might or might not allow public access to 
the documentation admitted there: "It depends on what's raised, 
what questions come up." (Ld. at 62). Judge Ballif concluded that 
the media in this case had received what they had requested, i.e., 
the preliminary hearing transcripts, which gave them access to the 
same information the media would have seen and heard by attending 
the preliminary hearing itself (id. at 62-63).5 
As for the separate, broader issue of whether the media are 
constitutionally entitled to physically inspect and copy any 
exhibit related to any utterance or visual perception at a 
presumptively open court proceeding, Judge Ballif added, 
That's another matter. I don't think that we could 
frame anything that would give you a right to go to the 
Supreme Court and get an advisory opinion on that. You'd 
have to have a particular instance occur before that could 
develop that far in the judicial process. 
(Id. at 63). Judge Ballif reiterated that this separate 
constitutional issue of access to any and all evidence admitted in 
open court had not been part of the media's previous presentation 
of issues for the district court's resolution. (.Id. at 65). The 
State agreed. (Id., at 67). 
Consistent with this discussion with counsel, the court's 
findings again defined the "pretrial documents" encompassed by its 
prior ruling, rejecting the media's first amendment access claim, 
as: 
the probable cause statements, affidavits in support of 
5Judges Park and Ballif were never advised by the media that 
the contents of these interview transcripts were not included in 
the opened transcripts of the preliminary hearing. 
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search warrants, subpoenas for witnesses, evidence obtained 
as the result of the use of such pretrial documents and 
tangible items of evidence including pictorial or 
diagrammatic exhibits received in evidence at the 
preliminary hearing and all other Court documents, not 
specifically published as part of the preliminary hearing 
proceedings before the committing magistrate, per se, but 
filed with the Justice Court in furtherance of the actual 
court hearing. 
(Finding of Fact 24, R. 1069). 
The court concluded that the media had failed to establish 
either prong of the Press Enterprise II test for extending a 
constitutional right of access to court-filed pretrial documents in 
these criminal cases (Conclusions of Law, R. 1072-73). Since the 
court also found no common law right of access to these documents, 
the seal on the court file was continued (Conclusions of Law, R. 
1074). With regard to the evidence admitted at the preliminary 
hearing, itemized above, the district court made no separate 
conclusion as to whether there is a common law right of access in 
Utah or a constitutionally protected, presumptive right of public 
access, for purposes of inspection and copying, before trial. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The media asked the trial judges in this case to declare what 
no other court has declared, i.e., that there is a first amendment 
presumptive right of public access to any pretrial document, in any 
type of case, once that document is filed in any court. The media 
could not support their request with the historical/structural 
showing required by Press Enterprise II that would counsel in favor 
of such a broad extension of first amendment law. There is simply 
no history anywhere of unrestricted public access to any document 
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once filed in any court. Indeed, the history and practice in Utah 
and elsewhere permit a court to seal entire court files or selected 
documents within them in some circumstances. There are numerous 
public policy reasons supporting these practices, including 
recognition of individual privacy rights, the protection of minors, 
and the need to conduct criminal investigations in secrecy. 
With regard to the particular pretrial documents at issue here, 
there are no public warrant or subpoena issuance proceedings, and 
there is no history of unrestricted public access to these 
processes or to the documents filed in connection with them. 
Public access would hinder, not help, the functioning of these 
early phases of the criminal justice process. In light of this, 
this Court should affirm the trial court and join numerous other 
courts that have held there is no first amendment presumptive right 
of public access to pretrial documents, including warrant and 
subpoena materials. 
The trial court was not asked to rule on whether the state 
constitution guarantees such presumptive public access to any 
pretrial document in any court file, even if the federal 
constitution does not. Accordingly, this separate state 
constitutional claim was not properly preserved in the trial court 
and should not be considered on appeal for the first time. If it 
is addressed, it should be rejected for the same reasons the 
federal constitutional claim should be rejected. 
The recently developed federal common law right of access to 
judicial documents in federal court is not determinative of, or 
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even instructive on, the issue of whether there is such a common 
law right in Utah, The media failed to demonstrate to the trial 
court that there is a common law right in Utah of public access to 
any pretrial document once filed in any court, including warrant 
and subpoena materials. Even if there were, that right has been 
modified by legislative enactments detailing the public's broad 
statutory right to inspect and copy public writings, including 
judicial records. 
The media declined to give the trial court an opportunity to 
rule on whether there is any public right, before trial, to 
physically handle, inspect, and copy exhibits introduced into 
evidence at a preliminary hearing. Hence, the issues related to 
such evidence—which here includes blood, bone, and hair samples, 
bloody levis, fingerprint impressions, and numerous photographs of 
the mutilated homicide victim, as well as tapes and transcripts of 
pretrial police interviews of the defendants—have been waived and 
are not properly before this Court on appeal. On the merits, the 
media have failed to demonstrate any compelling historical or 
practical basis favoring a constitutional right of physical access 
by the public, before trial, to physically handle and copy 
evidentiary exhibits, which may be needed at a subsequent criminal 
trial. In any event, the public's right of access to exhibits as 
judicial records is governed solely by statute in Utah. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE MEDIA FAILED TO SATISFY EITHER PRONG OF THE PRESS 
ENTERPRISE II TEST FOR EXTENDING EXISTING LAW AND HOLDING THERE IS 
A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF PRESUMPTIVE PUBLIC ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS 
FILED IN COURT IN CONJUNCTION WITH WARRANT AND SUBPOENA ISSUANCE. 
A. There is no history of public warrant or subpoena 
issuance proceedings, and no history of unrestricted access 
to all pretrial documents filed in any court or to the 
specific pretrial documents filed in conjunction with these 
criminal investigatory processes. 
In the district court, as on appeal, the media asserted that 
the public has a presumptive first amendment right of access to any 
"pretrial documents" once they are filed in court. In this case, 
the "pretrial documents" at issue are probable cause statements 
filed in support of arrest warrants, affidavits in support of 
search warrants, and witness subpoenas filed in conjunction with 
the phases of a criminal investigation and prosecution prior to 
preliminary hearing. 
Although media claim that an "overwhelming majority" of cases 
considering the issue have concluded that there is such a broad 
first amendment right that attaches to any document once filed in 
any court in any type of case (Appellants' Opening Brief at 17), 
the State of Utah is aware of no such majority, overwhelming or 
otherwise, and the media have cited none. Indeed, the State knows 
of no court that has held what the media seeks here, i.e., a ruling 
that the public has a first amendment right of access to any 
document in a civil or criminal case once it is filed in any court.6 
6The Tenth Circuit has, in fact, summarily rejected a 
similarly broad claim that the first amendment gives the public a 
presumptive right of access to all documents once they are filed in 
a court file. United States v. Hickev, 767 F.2d 705, 709 (10th 
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Each court considering a first amendment access claim in the 
context of a criminal prosecution has instead begun by focusing on 
the nature of the specific filed document sought and the nature of 
the specific part of the criminal prosecution process to which the 
document sought relates. Thus, the constitutional issue in this 
appeal, more properly framed, is: Is there a first amendment 
presumptive right of public access extending to pretrial documents 
filed in connection with the criminal warrant or subpoena issuance 
processes? Most courts that have considered this question in light 
of Press Enterprise II have answered, "No." 
In Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, the United States 
Supreme Court enunciated a two-part standard embodying 
"considerations of experience and logic" for determining whether 
the public's presumptive right of public access to criminal trials, 
a right grounded in the first amendment, extends to other pretrial 
proceedings in criminal prosecutions. The Court asked, first, 
"whether the place and process have historically been open to the 
public," and second, "whether public access plays a significant 
positive role in the functioning of the particular process in 
question." 
Cir.), cert, denied sub nom Hopkinson v. United States, 106 S.Ct. 
576 (1985); accord Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32-34 
(1984) (media has no first amendment right to access and publish 
information in civil pretrial depositions and interrogatories); 
United States v. Noriega, 752 F.Supp. 1037, 1040 (S.D. Fla. 1990) 
(press has no first amendment right of access to court-filed 
transcripts of taped conversation between defendant and his 
attorneys); Gannett Co., Inc. v. State, 571 A.2d 735 (Del. Sup. Ct. 
1989) (applies Press Enterprise II and finds no first amendment 
right of access to court's list of jurors' names), cert, denied, 
110 S.Ct. 1947 (1990). 
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Although this historical/structural standard was formulated in 
the context of the first amendment's guarantee of access to 
pretrial criminal proceedings, the district court and the parties 
in this case agreed that it should govern the court's determination 
of whether to extend existing law by concluding that the public has 
a presumptive right of access to any pretrial documents filed in 
court in conjunction with the pre-preliminary hearing phases of a 
criminal investigation. As the cases below demonstrate, other 
courts faced with the same issue presented here have done so. 
Although the media rely heavily on several Ninth Circuit cases, 
they do not mention the most recent Ninth Circuit decision, which 
is directly on point. The court rejected the notion that it had, 
in Associated Press v. United States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143 
(9th Cir. 1983), already found a right of access to all pretrial 
documents. Finding both considerations in the Press Enterprise II 
standard lacking, the unanimous panel held that there is no first 
amendment presumptive right of access to warrant materials filed in 
district courts, including search warrants, supporting affidavits, 
and inventories of the evidence seized after execution of the 
warrants. Times-Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210 (9th 
Cir. 1989). With regard to the first part of the Press Enterprise 
II test, the court found no historical tradition of open warrant 
proceedings or materials, which it considered extensions of the 
criminal investigation itself: 
We know of no historical tradition of public access to 
warrant proceedings. Indeed, our review of the history of 
the warrant process in this country indicates that the 
issuance of search warrants has traditionally been carried 
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out in secret. Normally a search warrant is issued after 
an ex parte application by the government and an in camera 
consideration by a judge or magistrate. 
Id. at 1213-14.7 As the panel noted, the United States Supreme 
Court recognized in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978), 
that proceedings for the issuance of search warrants are, of 
necessity, secret and not open to the public for the reason that 
such openness would alert the subject of the search. Times Mirror 
Co.. 873 F.2d at 1214; accord Newspapers of New England v. Clerk-
Magistrate, 531 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 n.9 (Mass. 1988). See also 
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 
(1972) (government must comply with fourth amendment's warrant 
requirement when engaging in domestic intelligence gathering; 
government's interest in keeping such investigations secret remains 
protected because "warrant application involves no public or 
adversary proceeding1'). 
The Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the media's claim that 
the usual practice of filing warrant materials with the court 
without obtaining an order sealing them prevented any conclusion 
that there is no history of unrestricted access to warrant 
materials. The government, the court pointed out, has always been 
able to restrict access to warrant materials by seeking a sealing 
7For this, the court cited In re Search Warrant for 
Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn,, 855 F.2d 569, 573 
(8th Cir. 1988), in which the Eighth Circuit also concluded there 
was no history of public access to warrant proceedings. 
Nonetheless, purporting to apply the Press Enterprise II standard, 
the Eighth Circuit found a first amendment right of access to 
affidavits in support of search warrants, discussed below at 27-34. 
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order, which courts have granted to preserve secrecy deemed by the 
government as necessary to a criminal investigation. .Id. at 1214; 
see also Seattle Times Co. v. Eberharter, 713 P.2d 710 (Wash. 1986) 
(applying historical/structural analysis and rejecting first 
amendment right of public access to search warrant and supporting 
affidavits because no historical tradition of access). 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has for the same reasons 
recently joined the Ninth Circuit and held that the media do not 
have a first amendment right of access to affidavits filed in 
support of search warrants. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 
60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989) (followed in In re Application and Affidavit 
for Search Warrant, 923 F.2d 324, 326 (4th Cir. 1991), cert, denied 
sub nom Hughes v. Washington Post Co., Ill S.Ct. 2243 (1991)). 
Applying the first part of the Press Enterprise II test, the Goetz 
court concluded there was, of necessity, no history of warrant 
application proceedings being open to the public. .Id. at 64. The 
Fourth Circuit concluded the same "common sense" reasons why 
warrant application proceedings are not open to the public support 
its conclusion that the media have no first amendment right of 
access, before or after warrant execution, to a sealed affidavit 
filed in support of a search warrant. Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64. The 
Fourth Circuit also agreed that the mere fact that warrant 
materials are routinely filed in court without a seal after 
execution does not mean that such access is "demanded by the first 
amendment." Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64. 
In the instant case, the media presented to the district court 
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no evidence of any different history in Utah of public access to 
warrant application proceedings or to the subpoena issuance 
process. In Utah, both processes typically do not involve pretrial 
court "proceedings" at all, although warrants require the 
involvement of a judicial officer. See Utah R. Crim P. 6 
(magistrate issues warrant or summons for accused after return of 
indictment or filing of information and supporting probable cause 
statement); Utah R. Crim P. 14(a) (witness subpoena may be issued 
by magistrate, county attorney, or court; court clerk may issue 
signed subpoenas to defendant); Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-4 (1990) 
(magistrate issues search warrant after finding probable cause); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-10 (1990) (authorizing telephonic issuance of 
arrest warrants); see also KUTV v. Conder, 635 P. 2d 412 (Utah 1981) 
(secrecy in hearing under Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-
22-1 to -4 (1990), is to protect innocent and to prevent criminal 
suspects from having access to information before prosecution). 
The media also did not demonstrate a differing history in 
Utah with regard to a trial court's authority—inherent, statutory, 
or by court rule—to seal a document in a court file. There simply 
is no history in Utah of unrestricted public access to any document 
once filed in any court regardless of the type or stage of judicial 
proceeding to which it relates. Although filing in a court may be 
the starting point for any analysis of the public's ability to gain 
access to a document, see Carter v. Utah Power and Light Co., 800 
P.2d 1095, 1099 (Utah 1990), the fact of filing alone is not, and 
has never been, determinative of the public access question. 
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Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-202, relied upon here by 
the media on appeal (though not cited to the trial court), itself 
supports the conclusion that there is no general "right" in Utah of 
public access to any document in a court file, but only to those 
court-filed documents open to the public because classified as 
"public data." Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-202(1)(A). The Code 
of Judicial Administration allows courts to seal and thereby 
categorically deny public access to nonpublic documents in court 
files that are: a) "private" judicial records, including driver's 
license histories, civil commitment proceedings, and sealed divorce 
case records; b) "confidential" court case files, including 
criminal presentence reports,8 custodial evaluations, home studies, 
and psychological evaluations, and other case records designated by 
statute, court order, or administrative rule as confidential; and 
c) judicial records sealed pursuant to statute or court rule. Utah 
Code Jud. Admin. Rules 4-202(3)(G), 4-202(4)(B), 4-202(5). Rule 4-
205(4)(A) provides: "Sealed, confidential, and private records 
shall not be available to the public." See also Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(c) (permitting sealing of discovery materials upon showing of 
good cause);9 Utah R. Crim P. 16 (authorizing protective orders and 
8The Seventh Circuit recently held that the media have no 
first amendment right of access to a presentence report, 
notwithstanding the media's first amendment right to attend the 
sentencing hearing itself. United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224 
(7th Cir. 1989). 
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has already 
held that a court rule authorizing a trial court to make a pretrial 
discovery document nonpublic upon a showing of "good cause" does 
not violate the first amendment. The Court expressly refused to 
require that the "good cause" standard incorporate a first 
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sealing of statements in course of discovery in criminal case); 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-702 (all juvenile court records are 
confidential, accessible only to limited individuals); Utah Code 
Jud. Admin. Rule 4-207 (providing procedure for court expungement 
and sealing of court records in criminal cases, including cases in 
which charges were never filed). These rules track the language in 
the now-repealed 1951 Archives and Records Services and Information 
Practices Act, which opened "public data" to the public but 
excluded from this category: data on individuals classified as 
private or confidential as well as data otherwise restricted by law 
from disclosure, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-61(10) (1939); and data on 
individuals relating to criminal investigations, Utah Code Ann. § 
63-2-89 (1989).10 
Numerous other Utah statutes render certain documents in court 
files, or entire court files, nonpublic or allow the courts to make 
amendment presumption of openness of judicial documents. Seattle 
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36-37 & n.23. 
10This policy in Utah against unrestricted access to any 
document filed in any court is likewise expressed in the new 
Government Records Access and Management Act [GRAMA], effective 
July 1, 1992, in which the legislature stated that it is sometimes 
necessary to restrict public access to some governmental records. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(2), (3)(b) (Supp. 1992). GRAMA excludes 
from accessible "public records" any records classified by the 
holder as private, controlled, or protected, and any records to 
which access is restricted pursuant to statute or court rule, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-201 (3) (Supp. 1992), and records held by a court 
to be confidential because of a "compelling interest," Utah Code 
Ann. S 63-2-405 (3) (Supp. 1992). Records created for criminal 
enforcement purposes may be classified as protected, Utah Code Ann. 
S 63-2-304(8) (Supp. 1992), and records containing data on 
individuals that, if disclosed would result in a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of privacy, may be classified as private, Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-302(2)(d) (Supp. 1992). 
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them nonpublic. JU^. , Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10(9) (1990) (judge 
issuing order for interception of wire, electronic, or oral 
communications shall seal order, application therefor, and 
transcription of intercepted communications); Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18-2 (Supp. 1992) (authorizing court expungement and sealing of all 
records in a criminal case, including those where no charges were 
brought); Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-6 (Supp. 1992) (court may seal 
record to protect trade secrets); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-247 
(1989) (seal on all records in judicial commitment proceedings); 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-15 (1992) (court must seal all documents 
filed in connection with adoption); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-55(l) 
(1992) (court records shall be open to juvenile's parents or 
custodians, parties, or their attorneys); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-
4(2) (Supp. 1992) (file in divorce action may be sealed on motion 
of either party); Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2(7)-(8) (Supp. 1992) 
(authorizing closed criminal investigative interrogation of 
witnesses and closure of records filed in conjunction with 
investigation, for good cause); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-10a-
2(1)(a), -13(2) (Supp. 1992) (pre-grand jury hearings and grand 
jury proceedings are not publicly accessible); see generally. 
Anno., "Public Access to State Court Records," 84 A.L.R.3d 598 
(1978). 
In short, although most documents are publicly accessible once 
they are filed in a court, there is no history of unrestricted 
public access to all court-filed documents in Utah. Thus, there is 
no historical tradition counseling in favor of recognizing a far-
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reaching presumptive first amendment right of public access to all 
pretrial documents filed in any court or to the particular pretrial 
documents at issue here. 
B. Presumptive public access to warrant and subpoena 
application processes, and to the "pretrial documents" 
filed in court in conjunction with them, would not play a 
significant positive role in the functioning of these 
investigative processes. It would, on the contrary, 
seriously interfere with those processes. 
The media cite many cases and suggest they support its view 
that, under the Press Enterprise II test, there is a first 
amendment right of access to any pretrial document once filed in a 
court. However, most of the cited cases involve access to pretrial 
criminal proceedings themselves or to documents filed in 
conjunction with presumptively open criminal pretrial proceedings. 
E.g., Seattle Times Co. v. United States District Court, 845 F.2d 
1513 (9th Cir. 1988) (media has first amendment right of access to 
pretrial release/bail proceeding in court and thus to access 
documents filed in court in conjunction with that proceeding); CBS, 
Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(first amendment presumptive right of public access applies to 
post-trial proceeding, motion to reduce sentence, and documents 
filed in connection with same); Associated Press v. United States 
Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983) (invalidating sua sponte 
trial court order, issued two months after indictment of John 
DeLorean and others, sealing all documents thereafter filed with 
the court; first amendment presumption of open pretrial proceedings 
applies generally to documents filed in regard to them); United 
States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2nd Cir. 1988) (first 
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amendment right of access extends to plea hearings, historically 
open to the public, and thus to plea agreements filed in connection 
with them); Washington Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 287-88 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550 (3rd Cir. 
1982) (pretrial suppression hearing); In Re Washington Post Co,, 
807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986) (sentencing hearing and documents).11 
Although it may seem at first blush that the Vermont Supreme 
Court has extended a first amendment right of public access to 
warrant documents, its decisions are actually grounded on a state 
statutory access right. In State v. Tallman, 537 A.2d 422 (Vt. 
1987), the trial court had, at defendant's request, closed parts of 
a suppression hearing to the public and sealed a probable cause 
uThree other cited cases provide no authority for the media's 
first amendment argument. In In re Search Warrant served upon John 
Doe Partnership, 548 N.Y.S.2d 389, 393, 145 Misc. 783 (Sup.Ct. 
1989), the New York trial judge specifically declined to reach the 
issue of any first amendment right of public access to a search 
warrant affidavit. In Journal Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 456 A.2d 
963 (Md. App. 1983), decided long before Press Enterprise II, an 
intermediate appellate court held that the first amendment 
presumptive right of public access to criminal trials and pretrial 
proceedings precluded an order closing pretrial suppression 
hearings and a blanket trial order sealing all the court files in 
seven cases against a single defendant, which included the probable 
cause statements in support of defendant's arrest. On further 
appeal, however, the Maryland Court of Appeals declined to review 
the appropriateness of the court file closure order, finding that 
it had become moot. Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, Inc., 297 Md. 
68, 465 A.2d 426, 435 (1983). Similarly, the Pennsylvania trial 
court in In re Affidavit for Search Warrant, 12 Media L. Rptr. 1904 
(Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 1986), concluded that access to probable 
cause statements not filed in court was part and parcel of the 
right to attend pretrial proceedings, relying on the decision of 
the intermediate appellate court in Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 
348 Pa. Super. 230, 502 A.2d 1316 (Pa. Super. 1986). When 
Fenstermaker was appealed, however, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania expressly declined to reach the first amendment issue 
since it analyzed the access, issue as one of state common law. 
Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d 314 (Pa. 1987). 
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statement that contained information testified to at that closed 
hearing. The appellate court vacated the closure order, concluding 
the suppression hearing was presumptively open under the Press 
Enterprise II test. .Id. at 426. Moving on to the issue of access 
to the warrant materials, the court spoke in terms of a 
"constitutional right of access to public records," but did not 
apply the Press Enterprise II analysis. Instead, it cited as 
authority for a "right" of access to warrant materials the dictum 
in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978), 
that there is "a general right to inspect and copy public records 
and documents, including judicial records," which refers to a 
refers to a federal common law right of access. In Nixon, the 
United States Supreme Court expressly rejected a claim of a first 
amendment presumptive right of physical access to evidence admitted 
at trial, i.e., audiotapes of presidential conversations. Thus, 
Nixon could have provided the Vermont court no authority for 
finding a first amendment right of access. Instead, the affidavits 
in support of an arrest warrant were held in Tallman to be "public 
records" accessible to the public under a Vermont statute once they 
were filed in a court. In light of this, Tallman and its progeny— 
Greenwood v. Wolchik, 544 A.2d 1156 (Vt. 1988), which relied in 
part on the intermediate appellate decision in Fenstermaker, see 
note 11, supra—provide no persuasive authority for the media's 
sweeping first amendment claim here. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely held that, 
under Press Enterprise II, the first amendment presumptive right of 
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public access extends to judicial documents, including court-filed 
affidavits in support of search warrant applications. In re Search 
Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn, 855 
F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Gunn]. The Eighth Circuit's 
application of the Press Enterprise II standard and its first 
amendment holding have been criticized and expressly rejected by 
the Ninth and Fourth Circuits, as well as by the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts in Newspapers of New England v. Clerk-
Magistrate, 531 N.E.2d 1261 (Mass. 1988), which have all held there 
is no first amendment right of public access to search warrant 
affidavits. 
Gunn involved the media's July 1988 request to unseal 
affidavits and other materials attached to two search warrants 
executed a month before at McDonnell Douglas Corporation as part of 
Operation 111 Wind, a nationwide FBI investigation of fraud and 
bribery in the defense industry that also gave rise to the Times 
Mirror decision. On appeal from a trial court order declining to 
lift the seal, the Eighth Circuit first acknowledged that the 
process of search warrant issuance is necessarily not open to the 
public. The panel went on to conclude that the warrant materials, 
once filed without seal, become accessible under the federal common 
law right of public access to public records recognized in Nixon. 
Id. at 573. Viewing a search warrant as an integral part of a 
criminal prosecution, the court then jumped to the second Press 
Enterprise II consideration and found that public access to warrant 
documents is: a) important to the public's understanding of the 
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function and operation of the judicial process and the criminal 
justice system; and b) may operate as a curb on prosecutorial or 
judicial misconduct. Satisfied that the Press Enterprise II test 
had been met, the court extended a first amendment presumptive 
right of public access to warrant materials. It nonetheless 
refused to unseal these documents, concluding that the qualified 
public access right must give way to the compelling governmental 
interest of an ongoing criminal investigation. Gunn, 855 F.2d at 
574. 
There are several things wrong with the Gunn court's 
analysis.12 First, it effectively discards the first half of the 
Press Enterprise II test by ignoring whether the underlying 
proceeding to which the documents relate has historically been 
publicly accessible. See Newspapers of New England, 531 N.E.2d at 
1266; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 510 (1st Cir. 
1989) (no first amendment access to judicial records of grand jury 
proceeding not resulting in indictment). The same commonsense 
reasons underlying the nonpublicness of the warrrant issuance 
process support the nonpublicness of the judicial documents used in 
that process. Times Mirror. 873 F.2d at 1217. Second, the Gunn 
court finds a history of public access to all court-filed warrant 
12Two factors, not present here, may have led to the court's 
strained first amendment reasoning in this high profile case: 1) 
there was no pending civil or criminal case against McDonnell 
Douglas or its employee, Dunn, in which the media could have 
obtained the warrant materials as part of its exercise of the right 
to attend pretrial hearings such as suppression hearings; and 2) 
there is no federal statutory right of access to judicial records 
because federal courts are exempt from the Freedom of Information 
Act, 5 U.S.C. S 551(1)(B) (1977). 
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documents based on the government's practice of filing only some 
warrant documents under seal, and uses this as a basis for 
concluding that the first amendment demands that all warrant 
documents be filed unsealed. Properly viewed, however, the fact 
that most warrant documents are not filed under seal "merely 
describes a practice in cases where the government presumably 
believes secrecy unnecessary; it does not establish that the First 
Amendment requires that warrant materials be filed without seal." 
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217; accord Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64. 
Third, as evidence of a history of access to warrant materials 
sufficient to support a constitutional right of access, Gunn 
confusingly relies on Nixon. As noted above, Nixon recognized a 
federal common law right of access to judicial documents, including 
trial exhibits, as public records, but also rejected a presumptive 
first amendment right of public access to evidence admitted at 
trial. The Fourth Circuit has correctly identified the Gunn 
court's mistake, one the media are asking this Court to repeat: 
" [RJecognizing that search warrants are judicial records . . . does 
not answer the question whether the press has a right of access 
secured by either the first amendment or the common law." Goetz, 
886 F.2d at 64.13 
13There are important differences between constitutional and 
common law rights of access. A first amendment right of 
presumptive access can be denied only by proof of a compelling 
governmental interest and then only if nondisclosure is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest. In contrast, the federal common 
law right of access can be denied by a trial judge exercising 
discretion in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of each 
case. Goetz, 886 F.2d at 64; see In re Washington Post Co., 807 
F.2d at 390. 
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Fourth, Gunn misapplies the second part of the Press Enterprise 
II test, under which the relevant consideration is whether creating 
public access would play "a significant positive role in the 
functioning of the particular process in question." Press 
Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. The "particular process" that should 
have been examined in Gunn was the warrant issuance process, but 
instead the court focused on the entire criminal justice system. 
See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1213. The media in the instant case 
similarly focus broadly, instead of narrowly on the particular 
processes in question. 
This wide-angled approach makes it easy to argue—as the media 
have in this case, in Times Mirror, and in Gunn—that public access 
would be beneficial by increasing the public's information about 
and involvement in the judicial system and by providing additional 
citizen scrutiny of public officials' actions. The media are thus 
essentially arguing that the first amendment compels openness of 
any document filed in a court if these ends would thereby be 
served. This Court should reject this oversimplistic argument, as 
has the Ninth Circuit, for several reasons. These goals of 
creating a citizenry that is informed about its judicial process 
and the workings of its criminal justice system, although 
undeniably worthy, can be and are achieved through public access to 
presumptively open pretrial criminal proceedings and the documents 
filed in conjunction with them. In addition, official abuses of 
power in the warrant or subpoena issuance processes are effectively 
policed by the parties themselves, i.e., by the accused at a 
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suppression hearing or trial or by a civil litigant in a damage 
action. See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1218; see also Gannett Co., 
Inc. v. DePasauale, 443 U.S. 368f 383 (1979). 
Most importantly, as the Ninth Circuit cautioned, a first 
amendment right should not be created in knee-jerk response to the 
media's claim that presumptive access to any judicial proceeding or 
any document filed in any court will benefit us as citizens: 
Were we to accept this argument, few, if any, judicial 
proceedings would remain closed. Every judicial 
proceeding, indeed every governmental process arguably 
benefits from public scrutiny to some degree, in that 
openness leads to a better-informed citizenry and tends to 
deter government officials from abusing the powers of 
government. However, complete openness would undermine 
important values that are preserved by keeping some 
proceedings closed to the public. Openness may, for 
example, frustrate criminal investigations and thereby 
jeopardize the integrity of the search for truth that is so 
critical to the fair administration of justice. 
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1213. In sum, although the public's 
legitimate interests in informed self governance and prevention of 
abuses of power would arguably be furthered by opening up every 
judicial proceeding and every document filed in a court, the same 
benefits could be said to flow from opening up grand jury 
proceedings,14 jury deliberations, or the internal communications 
and deliberations of judges on an appellate court. Id. 
But because the integrity and independence of these 
proceedings are threatened by public disclosures, claims of 
"improved self governance" and the "promotion of fairness" 
cannot be used as an incantation to open these proceedings 
1AThe United States Supreme Court has recognized, in the very 
case the media rely so heavily on, that "there are some kinds of 
government operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted 
openly," citing grand jury proceedings as an example. Press 
Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9. 
31 
to the public. Nor will the mere recitation of these 
interests open a particular proceeding merely because it is 
in some way integral to our criminal justice system. 
Id-
Like the media in Times Mirror, the media in this case have 
failed to satisfy Press Enterprise II by demonstrating how openness 
of warrant documents and an open warrant issuance procedure would 
positively contribute to the criminal investigatory process. Their 
inability to do so is understandable, since openness of warrant 
materials would not improve the functioning of the warrant process. 
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217. Indeed, the right of public access 
at any point in that process would seriously jeopardize it by 
discouraging potential sources of valuable information and by 
increasing the risks that suspects or arrest warrant subjects would 
flee or destroy evidence. JEci. at 1215. Because the social utility 
of open warrant processes and warrant documents is outweighed by 
the substantial burden openness would impose on criminal 
investigations, the second prong of Press Enterprise II is not 
satisfied in this case. See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217. 
Finally, although the difficulties in implementing any new 
first amendment right of access to all court-filed documents are 
not determinative of whether such a right should be recognized, the 
Court should not ignore the practical implications of the expansive 
right sought by the media in the trial court and in this Court. A 
ruling that all court-filed documents are presumptively open under 
the first amendment as interpreted in Press Enterprise II would 
effectively repeal the numerous Utah statutes and court rules that 
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currently authorize the sealing of some court-filed documents, 
discussed above at pages 19-23, without prior notice to or 
involvement of, members of the public. If all court-filed 
documents are presumptively open to the public, no court can 
henceforth seal an entire category of case files or documents 
within court files, regardless of how confidential or private the 
information contained in them, and no matter how important secrecy 
may be to an ongoing criminal investigation. Instead, the media 
contends, notice and hearing must be afforded—before sealing—to 
the media and the public, at which the person favoring sealing 
(possibly a mother giving up a child for adoption, a rehabilitated 
delinquent, a mental patient, or a prosecutor in the middle of an 
ongoing racketeering investigation) must bear the heavy legal, 
emotional, and financial burdens of showing why a court document 
should not be open to a newspaper reporter, or to a business 
competitor, or to a nosy neighbor. 
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, in a case 
rejecting a claimed first amendment right of the media to publish 
the contents of pretrial discovery materials that the trial court 
had subjected to a protective order under a "good cause" standard, 
heightened first amendment scrutiny of the sealing of any court 
record or document would require burdensome evidentiary findings 
and lead to time-consuming interlocutory appeals. Seattle Times 
Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36 n.23. The Ninth Circuit also 
noted this practical problem in the context of presumptive public 
access to pretrial warrant documents: 
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Our decision that no qualified right of access exists 
relieves the government of the considerable burden of 
responding on a case-by-case basis to actions such as these 
brought during the middle of an ongoing investigation. In 
contrast, the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit in 
[Gunn] requires the government to carry the burden of 
demonstrating on the facts of each case a compelling need 
for secrecy. 
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217 n.8. Furthermore, exactly how 
compelling a private or governmental interest in sealing would have 
to be to outweigh a beefy first amendment right of presumptive 
public access to pretrial court documents is not addressed by the 
media, which apparently believe that only sixth amendment rights 
can, and should, ever prevail over their first amendment rights. 
In light of the inherent supervisory power of courts over 
access to their own records and files, and perhaps influenced by 
the real life difficulties flowing from a holding that all pretrial 
court documents are presumptively open to the public under the 
first amendment, numerous federal courts have rejected or declined 
to reach first amendment claims like the media's here. They have 
instead analyzed the extent of public access to judicial materials 
under the more flexible federal common law right, see note 13, 
supra, which is subject to the trial judge's considerable 
discretion. In addition to In re Application and Affidavit for a 
Search Warrant, Washington Post Co. v. Hughes, 923 F.2d 324 (4th 
Cir. 1991), cert, denied sub nom Hughes v. Washington Post Co., Ill 
S.Ct. 2243 (1991), a case also involving access to an affidavit in 
support of a search warrant, see, for example, Nixon, 435 U.S. at 
597-99 (tapes); Hiekev, 767 F.2d at 708 (plea agreement); 
Application of Newsdav, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir.) (search 
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warrant application), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 2631 (1990); Goetz, 
886 F.2d at 65 (access to search warrant affidavit); In re Search 
Warrants Issued May 21, 1987, 1990 W.L. 113874 (D. D.C. 1990) 
(same); United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. at 1040 (transcripts 
of tapes); but see Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1218-19 (rejecting 
both first amendment and federal common law right of public access 
to all pretrial documents). Some state supreme courts, in 
decisions also cited as supporting authority by the media, have 
used the same pragmatic approach under state common law. 
Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 419 (access to arrest 
warrant affidavits); Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 637 P.2d 966 
(Wash. 1981) (access to court-filed affidavits of probable cause, 
search warrants and returns on them). 
Because the media have failed to make the showing of 
"experience and logic" required by Press Enterprise II before 
extending a first amendment presumptive right of public access to 
court filed documents, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
holding that there is no such right of public access to any 
pretrial documents once filed in any court, including warrant and 
subpoena issuance materials.15 
15In the narrow context of warrant proceedings, this result 
protects the important privacy interests of those innocent parties 
who are investigated but never charged with a crime. Times Mirror, 
873 F.2d at 1216. Significant privacy interests of others 
involved, often not voluntarily, in judicial proceedings—mothers 
surrendering babies for adoption, persons in treatment for mental 
illness, businesses with trade secrets sued by competitors—will 
likewise be protected by this court's rejection of a broad first 
amendment right of public access to any court-filed document. 
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II. THE MEDIA WAIVED THEIR DISTINCT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM 
BASED ON ARTICLE I, SECTION 15, BY NOT RAISING IT AND OBTAINING A 
RULING ON IT FIRST IN THE TRIAL COURT. IN ANY EVENT, THIS COURT 
SHOULD NOT INTERPRET THAT PROVISION AS CREATING A PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT 
OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT-FILED PRETRIAL DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING 
WARRANT AND SUBPOENA MATERIALS, FOR THE SAME REASONS THAT IT SHOULD 
REJECT THE MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM. 
The media assert that, even if there is no right of public 
access to court-filed pretrial documents under the Press Enterprise 
IJ. standard, this Court should apply a separate state 
constitutional test and find such an independent right under 
article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution. This provision, 
the media now contend, provides broader public access to court 
documents than the first amendment because it uses the words 
"abridge or restrain" instead of just the word "abridging." 
Absent exceptional circumstances, a claim raised on appeal for 
the first time, even a constitutional claim, is not properly 
preserved for consideration by an appellate court. Espinal v. 
Board of Educ., 797 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990); State v. Anderson, 
789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 
(Utah App. 1991). The proper forum in which to commence state 
constitutional analysis and interpretation is the trial court. 
State v. Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 72, 74 (Utah App. 1992); State 
v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990). The trial court 
here was not asked to determine whether there is a separate test 
under article I, section 15, for guaranteeing public access to 
pretrial court documents, distinct from the Press Enterprise II 
standard, and, if so, whether that test was met in this case. 
Accordingly, this Court should decline to address the issue. 
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If the state constitutional claim is nonetheless reached, it 
should be rejected on the merits. The State of Utah does not agree 
that this Court has ever articulated a standard by which to measure 
the scope of the Utah Constitution's guarantee of freedom of the 
press as it relates to all pretrial court-filed documents and not 
just to pretrial criminal proceedings. The test crafted and used 
by the media, i.e., whether court-filed pretrial documents "are 
crucial to preserving an informed involvement in the operations of 
government," is so nebulous as to constitute no guiding standard at 
all. As noted above, an arguable benefit to an informed citizenry 
is alone insufficient basis for holding that the constitution 
demands presumptive public access to any document in a court file, 
since similar benefits would likely flow from complete openness of 
every governmental process and governmental record. Scrutiny of 
judges and prosecutors and the community's knowledge of, and 
involvement in, the criminal justice system is provided, as this 
Court has recognized, through constitutionally guaranteed public 
access to and attendance at pretrial criminal proceedings. See 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1177 
(Utah 1987); Kearns-Tribune, 685 P.2d at 518. 
The media have provided no historical or logical basis for 
expansively interpreting article I, section 15 as creating a state 
constitutional right and thereby mandating that every document 
filed in any Utah court, including documents connected to warrant 
or subpoena issuance, be presumptively open to the public. Indeed, 
the history in Utah and elsewhere of restricted public access or 
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nonaccess to warrant and subpoena issuance processes and to some 
categories of court files or court documents, detailed above under 
Point I, counsels strongly against the state constitutionalization 
of presumptive public access to them under the Utah Constitution. 
The Utah statutes allowing for sealing of some court documents, 
including pretrial documents, reflect the collective view of the 
people of this state that the public's and the India's access to 
information found in court documents is, in some circumstances, 
trumped by individual privacy interests, our societal interest in 
protecting juveniles, or the public need to investigate suspected 
crime in secrecy. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THERE IS NO UTAH COMMON 
LAW RIGHT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT-FILED PRETRIAL DOCUMENTS IN 
UTAH. EVEN IF THERE WERE, IT HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED BY STATUTES 
REGULATING PUBLIC ACCESS TO JUDICIAL RECORDS AS PUBLIC WRITINGS. 
The media have cited to the trial court and to this Court 
several federal cases recognizing a federal common law right of 
public access to judicial records as public records, including 
pretrial documents once filed in court. This right is subject to 
the trial court's exercise of discretion under the relevant facts 
and circumstances of each case. In addition, the media cite the 
opinions of two state courts that have recognized a similar state 
common law right of public access to documents once filed in court. 
(Media Opening Brief at 30). 
These cases from other jurisdictions, however, provide no 
precedential authority for a conclusion that there is such a common 
law right in Utah. See State ex rel. KOIN-TV v. Olsen, 711 P.2d 
966, 971 (Ore. 1985) (federal courts "ordinarily not the place in 
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which [the Oregon Supreme Court] would seek the common law"). Utah 
has, by statute first enacted at statehood in 1898, adopted the 
common law insofar as it is not in conflict with the constitution 
or laws of this state or the United States. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-
1 (1986);16 State ex rel. R.R. v. C.R., 797 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 
App. 1990). Although information about the relevant common law 
rules at the time of Utah statehood is sparse, the Oregon Supreme 
Court has stated its view of the public's restricted ability at 
common law to inspect court records kept by the clerk of the court: 
"At common law no person is entitled to inspect 
public records, either personally or by agent, or to make 
copies, abstracts or memoranda therefrom, unless he has 
such an interest therein as would enable him to maintain or 
defend an action for which the record sought can be 
furnished as evidence or necessary information, and the 
interest of the person demanding the inspection must be 
direct and tangible." 
Bend Publishing Co. v. Haner, 118 Or. 105, 244 P. 868 (1926) 
(quoting 34 Cyc. 592, 593); accord Mulford v. Davev, 64 Nev. 506, 
186 P.2d 360 (1947); Burton v. Reynolds, 110 Mich. 354, 68 N.W. 
217 (1896); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (1893); Anno., 
"Public Access to State Court Records," 84 A.L.R.3d 598, 626 §§ 
10(b), (d) (1978); see generally. Anno., "Restricting Access to 
Judicial Records," 175 A.L.R. 1260, 1267-68 (1948). 
Although actual practice with regard to public access to some 
judicial documents may have altered over the years in other 
i6The statute provides: "The common law of England so far as 
it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the constitution or 
laws of the United States, or the constitution or laws of this 
state . . . is hereby adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in 
all courts of this state." 
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American states or as a matter of federal common law applicable to 
documents filed in federal courts, neither is determinative of the 
common law issue in Utah. The media have cited no Utah cases 
adopting for this state a common law "right" of public access to 
court-filed judicial records as public documents that is broader 
than the limited public access to judicial records available at 
common law. The trial court thus correctly ruled that the media 
failed to establish that the public has a common law right in Utah 
of access to any pretrial document once filed in a court. 
In any event, even if the trial court were wrong on this point, 
any common law right of public access to pretrial documents as 
judicial records has, by virtue of section 68-3-2, been superseded 
in Utah by legislation that comprehensively regulates the area of 
public access to public writings and public data, including 
judicial records. See Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 
P.2d 1332, 1337 (Utah 1982) (statute prevails over conflicting 
common law rule); see also Nixon, 435 U.S. at 604-07 & n.18 
(federal Presidential Recordings Act modifies federal common law 
right of access to tapes admitted as evidence at trial); Mulford, 
186 P.2d at 361 (statute granting right to inspect and copy all 
public records altered common law rule); Bend Publishing Co., 244 
P. at 869 (same). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-2 (1992) (repealed effective April 
1, 1992, by 1991 Utah Laws, ch. 259), every citizen has a right to 
inspect and copy any public writing, except as otherwise expressly 
provided by statute. The term "public writing" was defined to 
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specifically include judicial records. Utah Code Ann. § 78-26-1(2) 
(1992). The legislature also comprehensively provided for a public 
right of access to "public data" in the Archives and Records 
Services and Information Practices Act# Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-66 
(1992) (also repealed effective April 1, 1992 by 1991 Utah Laws, 
ch. 259).17 
In light of these statutes, the issue of what public access the 
common law in Utah would or would not (or should or should not) 
provide to the pretrial documents in a court file has been rendered 
academic by the legislature's preemption of the subject. 
Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that there is no common law 
right of public access in Utah to pretrial documents once filed in 
any court, including the documents at issue here, should be 
affirmed. 
IV. THE MEDIA HAVE FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL ANY CLAIM OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR COMMON LAW RIGHT TO INSPECT AND COPY, BEFORE 
TRIAL, EVIDENCE ADMITTED IN COURT, SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
RULE, AND WAS NEVER ASKED TO RULE, ON THESE CLAIMS. 
In Part II of its Opening Brief, the media ask this Court to 
hold that they, as well as the general public, have either a 
federal constitutional right, a state constitutional right, or a 
state common law right of "access," meaning the right to inspect 
and copy, all exhibits admitted into evidence in court. These 
claims, presented on appeal as Issues 4-6 (Media Opening Brief at 
1-2), were not briefed or argued before the trial court, and the 
17Both acts have been replaced by the comprehensive 
Governmental Records Access and Management Act [GRAMA], Utah Code 
Ann. SS 63-2-101 to -909 (Supp. 1992), effective July 1, 1992. See 
note 10, supra. 
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trial court made no ruling on them. 
The trial court did conclude in its November 1989 memorandum 
decision that the media had no first amendment right of presumptive 
public access to any pretrial documents once filed in a court 
(Decision, R. 958-61), and it accordingly declined to unseal the 
court file in this case that contained the pretrial documents 
(Order of October 23, 1989, R. 944). However, the judges made it 
plain in this decision that they were treating the documentary 
exhibits received into evidence at the preliminary hearing 
(transcripts of police interviews with defendants, photographs of 
the victim's body taken by the medical examiner, and diagrams drawn 
by the medical examiner and other witnesses) as included within the 
media's generic argument about "pretrial documents." The judges 
defined "pretrial documents" for purposes of their ruling as 
encompassing, in addition to warrant affidavits and witness 
subpoenas, all "tangible items of evidence including pictorial and 
diagnostic exhibits, and all other Court documents not specifically 
published as part of the preliminary hearing." (Decision, R. 958). 
Up until this ruling, the only two issues before the trial 
court concerned access to pretrial documents and access to the 
transcripts of the preliminary hearing. No argument was presented 
by the media concerning access to evidence, with the media 
apparently assuming that the trial court would let them have a copy 
of the transcripts of the police interviews of Wood and Archuleta 
if the court ruled in their favor on the issue of access to the 
preliminary hearing transcripts themselves. The separate issue of 
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access to evidence did not really arise in this case until the 
trial court's November 1989 ruling that lifted the seal on the 
preliminary hearing transcripts but refused to lift the seal on the 
"pretrial documents." 
On January 11, 1990, the judges notified all parties' counsel 
of a hearing to be held on January 19 concerning the parties' 
objections to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
support of the court's prior decision• In this notice, the judges 
stated their willingness at that hearing to consider "any other 
matters pertaining to the Media in the above captioned cases which 
counsel deem appropriate to be considered in settling the record 
for appeal," as long as the court and other counsel were given 
twenty-four hours' notice of these other matters. (R. 1034). 
Although the record reveals no advance warning, the subject of 
a right of physical access to evidence was first broached by the 
media at the January 19, 1990, post-decisional hearing. 
(Transcript of Hearing, January 19, 1990, at 38-39, 64). In the 
ensuing discussion between Judges Ballif and Park and the parties' 
counsel, quoted above at pages 11-12, it is apparent that the 
judges believed strongly that they had not theretofore been asked 
to rule on any claimed right of physical "access" by the public to 
evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing. At this point, the 
media could have articulated these claims, along with supporting 
legal authority and legal argument, and simply requested from the 
trial court a supplemental ruling on the issues of access to 
evidence. However, the media took no action at this opportune 
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moment to preserve these issues properly by giving the trial court 
an opportunity to rule on them first. They never even explained to 
the judges what evidentiary items they wanted and why.18 They did 
not ask for, and did not get, a ruling by Judges Ballif and Park on 
their separate claims to a right of physical access, before trial, 
to inspect and copy any evidence introduced at the preliminary 
hearing. They should not be allowed on appeal to assign as error 
a ruling that Judges Ballif and Park never made, on issues to which 
the State was never asked to respond. The claims should therefore 
be deemed waived, and this Court should accordingly decline to 
address them on the merits. Espinal, 797 P.2d at 413; State v. 
Anderson, 789 P. 2d at 29; State v. Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 82 
(Utah App. 1992). 
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT GIVE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
A RIGHT, PRIOR TO A CRIMINAL TRIAL, TO PHYSICALLY INSPECT AND COPY 
EXHIBITS—HERE, MURDER WEAPONS, TISSUE SAMPLES, BLOODY CLOTHING, 
AUDIOTAPES AND CORONER'S PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM'S MUTILATED 
CORPSE, AS WELL AS DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS—ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT 
A PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
The media expansively claim the public has a constitutional 
right19 to inspect and copy any exhibit received into evidence at 
any presumptively open court proceeding, including a criminal 
preliminary hearing, at any stage of the judicial process. (Media 
18See pages 6-7, 10-11 & n.5, above. 
19Because the media have not articulated any basis for why the 
Utah Constitution should be interpreted as providing any greater 
right of public access, for inspection and copying of evidentiary 
exhibits, than the first amendment does, the State does not analyze 
the state constitutional question separately from the federal. See 
State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Brooks, 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 31 n.2 (Utah App. 1992). 
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Opening Brief at 15-16). There is, however, no such right because 
the first amendment guarantees the public access to the information 
made public at an open court hearing, not physical access to the 
items themselves. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 608 (no first amendment right 
to physically access and copy tapes admitted into evidence at open 
trial); United States v. Beckham, 789 F.2d 401, 408 (6th Cir. 1986) 
(same); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 424 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 105 (8th 
Cir. 1986) (same); State ex rel. KOIN-TV, 711 P.2d at 977 (same); 
Valley Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 798 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(no first amendment right to access and copy, during trial, 
photographs admitted into evidence); United States v. Thomas, 745 
F.Supp. 499 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) (no first amendment right to copy 
videotape admitted into evidence at open suppression hearing); 
People v. Glogowski, 135 Misc.2d 950, 517 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Cty. Ct. 
1987) (same), aff'd , 565 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1990); see. also United 
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 817 (3rd Cir. 1981) (media 
appellants concede there is no constitutional right to copy audio 
and videotapes admitted at trial). 
Although the cases cited by the media might be persuasive on a 
narrowly framed issue involving a specific request for access to 
specific evidentiary items introduced at the preliminary hearing in 
this case, they do not support the oversimplistically broad claim 
made here.20 The Seventh Circuit has recognized a first amendment 
20The media's brief is not clear or consistent about whether 
their arguments in Part II are addressed to all exhibits admitted 
in open court or just to some unspecified "documentary exhibits." 
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presumptive right of public access to inspect judicial records, 
including exhibits admitted at a criminal trial, United States v. 
Peters, 754 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1985), and to a litigation report 
admitted into evidence in open court at a hearing on a dispositive 
motion to terminate a shareholders' derivative suit, In re 
Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 
1984). United States District Judge Spellman has summarily 
concluded there is a first amendment and common law right of access 
to a videotape admitted into evidence and played in open court at 
a pretrial bond hearing, as well as to documents (tax returns) 
admitted into evidence at a criminal trial. United States v. 
Saunders, 611 F. Supp. 45 (D.C. Fla. 1985) (videotape); United 
States v. Posner, 594 F. Supp. 930 (D.C. Fla. 1984). Even Judge 
Spellman declined to hold that the press's first amendment right of 
"access" to the documentary evidence includes a right to copy it. 
Posner, 594 F. Supp. at 935.21 Another federal district judge has 
held that there is a first amendment right of public access to an 
The media have not sought "access" to the transcribed police 
interviews with defendants, which were admitted into evidence but 
not read into evidence at the preliminary hearing here. "Access" 
by the public to the information contained in those interviews may 
be protected by the first amendment as part of its constitutional 
right to attend a preliminary hearing, a right already recognized 
in Press Enterprise II and Kearns-Tribune. See, e.g., United 
States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (E.D. N.Y. 1981) 
(audiotape admitted into evidence, but not read into record, at 
sentencing hearing); State v. Anonymous, 40 Conn. Super. 38, 479 
A.2d 1244 (1984) (written statement admitted, but not read into 
record, at suppression hearing). 
21Contrary to the media's erroneous citation on page 37 of its 
brief, Judge Spellman's ruling in Posner has never been affirmed by 
a higher court. The citation given is to an Eleventh Circuit 
decision in a related appeal that does not involve access issues. 
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audiotape admitted into evidence at an open sentencing hearing, 
United States v. Carpentier, 526 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (E.D. N.Y. 
1981), but this ruling did not address the question of copying. 
Thus, the only cited case that finds a first amendment right to 
inspect and copy evidence, a videotape, admitted at a pretrial 
proceeding in a criminal case, Saunders, is directly contrary to 
the first amendment holdings in Nixon and other cases cited above. 
Whatever first amendment right there may be to inspect or copy 
trial exhibits, there are several obvious and compelling policy 
reasons not to throw open the doors of the trial court's exhibit 
room to the public before a criminal prosecution is complete. The 
physical integrity of original documents and nondocumentary 
exhibits (bloody levis, fingerprint impressions, tissue samples) 
must be preserved for trial through restricted access to exhibits, 
see Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-206, and the chain of custody of evidence 
to be used at trial must be documented. Some exhibits may be 
physically admitted in their entirety, but only portions admitted 
as evidence relevant to the issues at a preliminary hearing. In 
addition, evidence admitted at preliminary hearings in Utah, which 
is not necessarily legally admissible at trial (involuntary 
statements of defendant, gruesome photographs of victim), may be 
prejudicial to sixth amendment rights. Yet a presumptive right of 
public access to exhibits at the preliminary hearing phase would 
seem to preclude categorical sealing of such exhibits in all cases 
until defendants had evaluated the effects of release on their 
ability to obtain a fair trial. Finally, the administrative burden 
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placed on each court to police public access to the exhibit room 
and oversee the copying of exhibits outside the courthouse far 
outweighs any benefits to be gained by a physical inspection of 
exhibits that the public is already entitled to see or hear in an 
open court proceeding. The State therefore urges this Court to 
reject the sweeping constitutional claim asserted by the media on 
appeal with regard to physical access to, and copying of, 
evidentiary exhibits. 
VI. THERE IS NO COMMON LAW RIGHT IN UTAH OF PUBLIC ACCESS, FOR 
INSPECTION AND COPYING BEFORE TRIAL, TO ANY EXHIBIT ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING. ANY COMMON LAW RIGHT OF THE 
PUBLIC TO INSPECT AND COPY ANY EXHIBIT MADE PART OF THE JUDICIAL 
RECORD BY BEING ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE IN OPEN COURT HAS BEEN 
OBVIATED BY PREEMPTIVE STATE STATUTES REGULATING PUBLIC ACCESS TO 
PUBLIC DATA, INCLUDING JUDICIAL RECORDS. 
The media invite this Court to adopt as part of Utah's common 
law the federal common law right to inspect and copy evidence 
admitted in open court as a public, judicial document. All but one 
of the federal cases relied on by the media concern access during 
or after trial to exhibits previously admitted at trial.22 The 
facts of the instant case, however, only present the issue of 
physical access, for inspection and copying before a criminal 
trial, to exhibits introduced at a preliminary hearing. 
The media has made no effort to show what the relevant 
22The exception, United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980), recognized a federal common law right of public access 
to documents seized by the government from the Church of 
Scientology and introduced into evidence at a suppression hearing 
that was part of the criminal prosecution of church leaders. The 
court nonetheless denied public access to the documents because of 
the threat to privacy interests of the nondefendant church and 
individuals. 
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common law rule was at the time of Utah statehood and has not 
provided any reasoned basis for why this Court should adopt any 
part of the common law rule that has developed in federal courts 
since then. The broad right asserted by the media here would 
provide the public physical access to, and copying of, any 
evidentiary exhibit admitted at a preliminary hearing or any open 
court proceeding, a right that would be only surplusage to the 
public's constitutional right to the information available from 
attending the court proceeding itself. See note 20, supra. The 
absence of any history of unrestricted public access in Utah to 
exhibits, as well as the common sense reasons noted above for not 
giving the public carte blanche access to a court's exhibit room, 
strongly counsel against recognition of such a broad common law 
right. 
In any event, the common law has been obviated as a source of 
any access right in Utah to evidentiary exhibits as part of a 
judicial record. As previously discussed under Point III, the Utah 
Legislature has comprehensively regulated the area of access to, 
and copying of public records, including judicial records, thereby 
occupying the field. Because the access sought by the media is 
controlled by statute, there is no reason for this Court to rule on 
the common law issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah requests that this 
Court affirm the September 27, 1990, final order of Judges Park and 
Ballif. 
Respectfully submitted this 3/uCday of Augustv 1992. 
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